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Lynn A. Staeheli, Patricia Ehrkamp, Helga Leitner and Caroline R. Nagel
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What is This?
Dreaming the ordinary: Daily life and the complex geographies of citizenship

Lynn A. Staeheli
Durham University, UK

Patricia Ehrkamp
University of Kentucky, USA

Helga Leitner
University of Minnesota, USA

Caroline R. Nagel
University of South Carolina, USA

Abstract
This paper introduces the concept of ‘ordinary’ to analyze citizenship’s complexities. Ordinary is often taken to mean standard or routine, but it also invokes order and authority. Conceptualizing citizenship as ordinary trains our attention on the ways in which the spatiality of laws and social norms are entwined with daily life. The idea of ordinariness fuses legal structures, normative orders and the experiences of individuals, social groups and communities, making citizenship both a general category and a contingent resource for political life. We explore this argument using immigrants as an example, but the conceptualization of citizenship extends more broadly.

Keywords
citizenship, daily life, law, ordinary, social norms

I Jesus’ dream
In August 2002, Jesus Apodaca found himself in the middle of a political nightmare that threatened to result in the deportation of his family from the United States. Just two months before, he had been living the American dream. In June, he graduated from high school in Aurora, Colorado, with academic honours and as valedictorian. He came from an immigrant family, struggling to make ends meet, and the family was proud of his accomplishments. Jesus was offered admission to the University of Colorado and was given a scholarship. Then, it all unravelled.

In August, the University withdrew its offer of financial assistance and told Jesus he would
have to pay out-of-state tuition, because he entered the country illegally with his family when he was 12 years old. When the story was reported on the front page of *The Denver Post*, there was outrage. While some people were upset that a child who had achieved so much would be punished because of the acts of his parents, others were incredulous that the schools had educated an ‘illegal alien’. The University responded that the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act tied its hands. Title V, Section 505 of the act explicitly prohibits ‘eligibility for preferential treatment of aliens not lawfully present on basis of residence for higher education benefits’.

And that was as it should be, according to Tom Tancredo, a staunch critic of American immigration policies and, at that time, a Colorado member of the US House of Representatives. Tancredo announced that Jesus and his family should be deported, and he notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to that effect. Almost immediately, private relief bills were introduced by Colorado Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell and Representative Mark Udall. Private relief bills stop immigration proceedings for named individuals, placing a hold on deportations. Unless the bills are passed, however, the individuals remain in a sort of legal limbo, unable to obtain permanent residence, but given leave to remain in the country. Neither bill was passed or, importantly, defeated. While the bills are tabled, no action can be taken against the named individuals.

Jesus’ dream was like those of many other young people: he wanted to continue his studies at a university. But federal legislation prohibited him from paying the lower fees that other residents of the state of Colorado paid when they went to publicly funded universities, because that would give him ‘preferential treatment’. While Jesus’ dream quickly became a nightmare, his case was not unusual. In recognition of the problem – which predates Jesus’ specific case – a bi-partisan bill had been introduced in the 2001 Congress called the ‘Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors’ Act. The DREAM Act, as it was known, would have given states the option to allow people like Jesus to pay in-state fees for tuition. The bill was never debated, and so died. It was reintroduced in subsequent Congresses, but never passed. In 2006, it was included as part of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, but was defeated. It was reintroduced in 2007 and failed to get past a procedural hurdle; it was then included as an amendment to the Defense Authorization Act, but was ruled as non-germane to the Act. In 2010, an amendment was again attached to the Defense Authorization Act; the bill, however, included a number of amendments unacceptable to social conservatives, and was again defeated. While the Act was reintroduced in 2011, much of the activism for tuition equity shifted to the state level. Twelve states have passed some form of the act and some universities have allowed undocumented students to pay in-state fees, but both states and universities recognize they are in violation of federal legislation. Other universities have tried to establish privately funded scholarships for undocumented students, but with limited success.

Something that seems so ordinary for thousands of American high school graduates each year – going to a publicly funded university in the state of their residence – is in fact extra-ordinary for thousands more who cannot attend. For students with good grades, whose parents have worked hard and contributed to their local community, and who have lived in the USA all or most of their life, the inability to pay resident fees seems both an insurmountable and an unfair hurdle. It seems insurmountable because the fees are so high and financial assistance is limited. It seems unfair because something that has become an expectation as a social right of citizenship for American teenagers is not available to those who are citizens in all but legal status.

Citizenship is a status that is framed by norms, constitutions, laws, and policies that
delineate a bundle of rights and responsibilities. In addition, however, citizenship is also practiced and experienced as people move through their daily lives and as opportunities afforded by citizenship are opened and closed for particular individuals at particular moments. Significantly, everyday practices and experiences might seem to be unrelated to legal standing, and in some cases the practice and experience of citizenship might actually contradict legal and normative ideals. For example, even if the law affords them equal rights, women and racial minorities are not all able to enjoy de facto equality (Lister, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 1997). There is also a spatiality to citizenship that makes it ordinary and extraordinary. Citizenship is located in multiple sites, some of which are material places, some of which are symbolic, and some of which are institutional. And the people who hold citizenship enact their own spatial practices, confounding the territorial framing of citizenship codified in law. Despite its seeming complexity and incoherence, citizenship is bound up with the processes and relationships that structure lives and politics in ways that cannot be ignored and that also provide the basis for political struggles.

In this paper, we offer a way to understand the complexities of citizenship through the concept of ordinariness. Ordinary is often taken to mean standard, routine, or average, but its etymology refers to the Latin word for order, including social and legal order. We use the broader meaning of ordinary to highlight the ways in which citizenship is simultaneously constituted through encounters with law and daily life; in these encounters, the spatiality of each is integral to the relationships and practices that position individuals and social groups with respect to such communities. Throughout the paper, we return to the example of Jesus who, like many other immigrants, is excluded from formal citizenship. Immigrants, we argue, provide a lens into negotiations regarding citizenship, because they have no claims or political standing except those granted by societies and by states (Ngai, 2004). Hence, the promise of citizenship becomes even more crucial to those people whose standing within a political community cannot be assumed. Such people often struggle to overcome exclusion from citizenship and must live with these exclusions on a daily basis. The conceptualization of citizenship as ordinary trains our analytical lens on the ways in which laws and social norms are entwined with the routine practices and experiences of daily lives, as citizens – and other political subjects – negotiate exclusion and marginalization.

II Ordinary citizenship: entwining law and daily life

The idea that formal, legal, and institutional structures intersect with daily life is not new of course, and is something that feminist, anticategorical, queer, postcolonial, and other critical theorists have long argued. Such scholars have been at pains to demonstrate the ways in which the state is enmeshed in the spheres of daily life (e.g. Jones et al., 2011; Painter, 2006), and that individuals and social groups respond in diverse and complex ways that profoundly – but not necessarily predictably – shape the cities and societies in which we live (e.g. Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2010). This complexity may involve the formation of identities and the articulation of grievances that represent collective challenges through the performance of seemingly mundane acts or micropolitics (e.g. Bayat, 2010; Smith, 1990). While not the stuff of ‘big politics’ or perhaps not even conceptualized as political by some radical scholars (e.g. Ranciere, 2001; Swyngedouw, 2011), these sorts of small actions, challenges, and the experiments to which they give rise can lead to varied forms of contact and engagement that hold the potential to nudge established patterns of control and authority and to anticipate new political acts (Holston, 2008; Simone, 2009). We introduce our conceptualization of citizenship as ordinary
in this section of the paper, anticipating the potential of the everyday as it is entwined with law and other structures of citizenship. In the following section, we use this understanding to reinterpret the frameworks that underpin debates over citizenship more generally. In so doing, we highlight the ways in which ordinary practices of citizenship are leveraged in law and everyday settings to set the stage for the political acts through which citizens may be simultaneously and variously included and excluded from particular communities and places. The resulting forms and practices of citizenship are – in their broadest sense – ordinary, diverse, shifting, and complex.

We begin this argument with what may seem a rather curious source: the dictionary. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary defines ordinary as having ‘no special or distinctive features; uninteresting; commonplace’ and as ‘exercising authority by virtue of office, not by delegation’. Dictionary.net includes another definition as ‘norms, normal and according to established order; methodical; settled; regular’. And the Random House Dictionary of the English Language adds the definition of ‘customary’. Importantly, it traces ordinary to the Middle English word ordinarie, which in turn comes from the Latin words for ‘order’ and ‘pertaining to’. The very term ‘ordinary’ is thus grounded in relations of rule and power that become standard, common, and unremarkable. These dictionary definitions neatly suture together two conceptualizations of citizenship that have dominated much of the scholarly and political debate, but that have often been placed in opposition.

A fundamental division within the literatures on citizenship is grounded in whether citizenship is conceptualized primarily as a legal category or as a positioning with respect to the polity. Among those who ground their understanding of citizenship in law, issues related to citizenship as a form of birthright (Shachar, 2009), the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (Benhabib, 2004), and the protections and agency for those who are not citizens in the places in which they live (Bauböck, 1994) may be overarching concerns. Each of these issues emphasize the legal, procedural and institutional systems that support – or that fail to support – citizens. Among those who understand citizenship as a position with respect to the polity (e.g. Lister, 1997), substantive concerns over the qualities of polities, belonging, membership, marginalization, and exclusion predominate. Together, these two positions are the basis for debates over citizenship as largely procedural or substantive.

This dichotomy may seem overdrawn for geographers, but it is worth remembering that debates about citizenship have taken particular forms within the discipline, and that the longer genealogy of citizenship debates may be rather different to current understandings. From this broader perspective, it is possible to point to debates over citizenship as emphasizing its procedural or substantive nature, liberal or republican inclinations, and so forth, with each couplet layered onto the dichotomy between legal status and positioning with respect to the polity. Our particular intervention in these debates is to argue that citizenship is constructed through the interactions of both status and positioning. It is part of daily life, something we enact, even as it is part of a broader system by which order is maintained. Many of us quite happily live our lives without thinking about our citizenship for extended periods of time. But citizenship is also involved in establishing an order that enables us to go about our lives. Ordinariness thus fuses legal structures, normative orders, and the practices and experiences of individuals, social groups and communities, making citizenship both a general category and a contingent resource for political life. We explore this argument further through a more detailed examination of the frameworks that underpin scholarly research on citizenship in geography and beyond. In all cases, we emphasize the ways in which the
frameworks reflect an often unarticulated appreciation of the ways in which law and daily life are entwined.

III Frameworks of citizenship

Our argument builds on an abundance of scholarship. Several special issues in geographic journals attest to the salience of citizenship to geographic inquiry (cf. Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006; Kurtz and Hankins, 2005; Painter and Philo, 1995; Rumford, 2008; Staeheli, 2003). Within this scholarship, studies examine the tensions between status, acts, subjectivity, and the sites, spaces, and territorial entities that enable and constrain citizenship (Brown, 2006; Holston, 2008; Isin, 2002; Lister, 1997; Painter and Philo, 1995). Many studies question the claims to universalism and equality inherent in conceptions of liberal democratic citizenship, demonstrating how groups remain marginalized from full membership (Isin, 2002; Lister, 1997; Yuval-Davis, 1991, 1997). Some scholarship further differentiates between passive and active citizenship (e.g. Kearns, 1995; Lister, 1997), while Isin’s (2008) proposal to consider ‘acts of citizenship’ dislodges citizenship from pre-given citizen subjects, their experiences and practices. Collectively, the legal and normative frameworks used in this literature underpin the ways in which the citizen-subject and the spatiality of citizenship are understood.

I Legal frameworks for citizenship

Jesus’ story is one in which the importance of law and legal frameworks of citizenship is made visible. Indeed, many people who voiced an opinion argued that the law was the only relevant issue in his case. But Jesus’ experience demonstrates that the accretion of constitutions, laws, jurisprudence, and policies creates legal frameworks that are complex, spatially differentiated, and internally inconsistent. This complexity is amplified when the broad range of legal frameworks from multiple countries, from international law, and from localities is considered. To make sense of this complexity, we begin with the analysis provided by legal theorist Linda Bosniak (2006). Taking citizenship primarily as a legal category, she argues that there are two types of constitutional and legal practices that define and delimit citizenship; these include rules that define who is a member and rules about how members are to be treated. Rules governing the delimitation of citizenship include how membership is distributed, the characteristics of those deemed worthy of citizenship, and the territorial units to which citizenship is attached (e.g. the nation). Rules governing the ways in which members should be treated include the rights and responsibilities of citizenship and the relationships between the state, polity, and individuals. While Bosniak argues that the two sets of laws delimiting citizenship are distinct, we argue that there is considerable overlap as people move through their daily lives. This can be seen in several ways.

First, if some rules define who is a member, and other rules define how members are to be treated, then there can be confusion as to whether rules about how citizens are to be treated apply to immigrants who are not officially members. Bosniak (2006) argues that relatively few countries have explicit rules delimiting the rights of non-citizens, and even fewer are consistently applied. For example, some legislation in the United States limits the ability of immigrants to receive social benefits, such as social security or access to primary and secondary education. Yet those laws are at odds with employment legislation that requires immigrants with permanent residency to pay taxes for social security and with federal legislation that requires that children have access to the education system irrespective of their legal status. Many pieces of legislation have been rescinded or struck down in the court system,
yet the legislation remains part of the law, even if it is not enforceable. The result in this, and other cases, is a hodge-podge of rules that are inconsistently applied and therefore add to the complexity of citizenship that individuals and families negotiate. The issue of families is very important here, as in countries where citizenship is granted to anyone born in the country, families may have a variety of legal standings; rules that apply to individuals are experienced through families and households that are positioned differently with respect to the law and the communities in which they live.

While it might be desirable to have clear and consistent rules, the complexities discussed above may nevertheless create opportunities for individuals that may work to some people’s advantage, and often in surprising ways. Jesus’ saga is an example. The law that was interpreted as barring him from receiving a scholarship was a federal immigration law passed in 1996. When it became clear that students such as Jesus would be deemed ineligible, the initial DREAM Act was introduced. When the targeted bill failed, amendments were attached to other federal bills and state legislatures tried to amend their laws. And of course, court cases have abounded (Glenn, 2011). While the confused legal terrain in this single example is perhaps overwhelming, it does provide some opportunities precisely because of its complexity. When at last Jesus’ family appeared in the Denver papers, it was because a judge had issued an order that halted deportation proceedings and ordered that family members receive the same benefits as if they were legal residents. This offers relief, even if the ruling appears to make the legal waters even murkier.

Second, in countries with complex legislative and judicial systems, it is not always clear which elements of the system should be used for immigrants. Coleman (2007) has noted that many immigration proceedings in the USA are governed by civil law, where there is a lower standard of proof, even though decisions from those proceedings are often enforced by police power and criminal penalties. Precisely because individuals are not recognized as citizens, constitutional and legal protections are minimal. Yet other parts of the process draw on state powers to punish and enforce penalties as though the individuals were citizens. The effect is to create a legal space of lawlessness, where the laws and provisions to protect human rights no longer apply (see Dikey, 2009; Humphreys, 2006).

Third, adding to the complexities of citizenship is the spatiality of law and legality, even when the discussion is focused on one country. In Jesus’ case, the legal framework is shaped by: the US Constitution, legislation and executive orders at the federal level, constitutions and laws in all 50 states, and laws and ordinances enacted in a host of counties and local governments. This legislative apparatus is complicated further by a judicial structure that comes to a peak at the US Supreme Court, but that includes appellate and district courts under the federal judiciary, and then an equally complex set of court systems in each of the states. Power, politics, and the potential to challenge issues are built into this structure. Citizens – and those who might strive to be recognized as citizens – attempt to harness that potential through contestation intended to make exclusion legible and to imagine new ideals of citizenship in the sites and spaces of the everyday (Holston, 2008). In so doing, alternative norms and values are often used to contest legal categories and practices.

2 Normative frameworks for citizenship: justice and care

Debates over citizenship – in law, in academic writing, and in public discourse – often hinge on the ways in which competing values are activated, combined, and interpreted. Participants in debates over citizenship may not articulate the norms and values that underlie their positions, yet these norms and values are important. According to Olson and Sayer (2009: 184),
norms ‘can be thought of as generalized, sedimented valuations of things, or dispositions towards them. They are about something. Our values guide particular evaluative judgements but can be reviewed and modified in the light of anomalous evidence arising from these particular evaluations’. In this way, norms can be seen to underlie public debates or experiences of the world, but also to change in response to what is observed. Norms may be sedimented in law, but are not perfectly defined or completely settled by law. Instead, they are activated, expressed, and tested in a variety of domains.

Central to many positions taken in debates over citizenship is the way participants prioritize either justice or care as the defining norm of citizenship and its ability to foster self-development and well-being. Justice involves several, subsidiary principles, including fair and equal treatment of all individuals qua individuals, decision making and behaviour that is governed by the rule of law, and impartiality (cf. De Genova, 2007). But justice can be seen as more than a matter of law, as extending into the social relationships of daily life, and as applying to everyone, regardless of legal status. Academic proponents of this broad notion of justice as the normative foundation of democratic citizenship include Buböck (1994), Benhabib (2004), Gould (2004), Mouffe (2005), Walzer (1983), and Young (2000).

Sitting alongside justice-based norms of citizenship are theories that emphasize an ethic of care. Care rests on a complex notion of equality that is based on the satisfaction of situated and particular needs that arise from the recognition of difference and the practices of accommodation (Jaggar, 2001). Sceptical of equality as the sole criterion of justice, proponents of an ethic of care argue that the varied sociopolitical practices and relationships, and individuals’ positioning within them have to be considered in building a democracy that can foster the well-being of the citizenry. While the procedures and rights discussed in many justice-oriented theories are important, they play a complicated role in the relationships and practices that condition democratic citizenship. Philosophies of care often recognize the importance of individual and human rights while also emphasizing mutual obligation and reciprocity beyond the family or domestic sphere (Held, 2006; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Tronto, 1993). Care requires more than a recognition of and acting on the basis of affective bonds or feelings of mutuality, however, as many feminist political theorists argue that care is an obligation of democratic citizenship (Bubeck, 1995; Miller, 2005; Tronto, 2005).

We can identify at least two domains in which norms of justice and care in relation to citizenship are evident in the legal frameworks discussed previously; these are norms in relation to the boundaries of belonging – including how membership is distributed – and norms in relation to the rights and responsibilities of citizens. These domains are frequently discussed together in terms of the substantive aspects of citizenship, but their normative bases are less frequently explored. Jesus’ case helps not only to ground our abstract discussion of these issues, but also to crystallize what is at stake. In so doing, it is possible to anticipate how norms would be combined in different domains to understand the varied responses to Jesus’ circumstances (see Table 1).

If justice is held to be the normative foundation of citizenship and the issue of the boundaries of membership was deemed to be most important in the case, it would be reasonable to argue that states set the rules of entry to a polity and thereby to citizenship rights. Jesus’ parents did not follow these rules, so it is appropriate to deny rights and benefits to him. If, however, one focused on justice as defined by the rights and responsibilities of individuals, one could reasonably argue that Jesus was not responsible for his parents’ actions and so should not be punished. The parents might have
crossed into the USA without permission, but while in the USA they had lived as responsible members of the community, paid taxes, worked hard, and followed all the rules, except those governing entry. Since the Apodacas had lived in the USA for years without transgressing other laws or expectations, punishing Jesus for an action he was compelled by his parents to commit would not be consistent with ideas of justice.

A normative stance prioritizing care in citizenship could lead to a similar conclusion, arguing that the boundary issues should be irrelevant at this point, in part because deportation would sever the relationships of mutuality between Jesus, the family and the community that had been built and fostered over the years. The family was already within the borders of the USA, so the relationships that tie them to their community would surely take priority. Furthermore, by all accounts, the family and Jesus were active, responsible members of the community. Responsibilities go two ways, an advocate of care might argue. The community has responsibilities to those who have lived in and contributed to it as members, including the responsibility to support their nurture and development. From an ethical stance emphasizing care, it would not be appropriate to deport the family because there is a collective obligation towards them, and so family members should be treated as though they held the formal status of citizen.

This is obviously a crude, simplistic assessment that relies on oppositions, but it provides a way of thinking about the ways in which different dimensions of citizenship are assembled in daily life and may inform the ways in which differently positioned individuals and groups frame their theories of citizenship and attempt to order their worlds. In the assemblage of law, norms, and everyday life, we are forced to recognize the simultaneity and diversity of the relationships and processes that structure citizenship; this is our rationale for an understanding of citizenship that is ordinary. Thinking of citizenship as ordinary also draws attention to the often uneasy relationships between individuals, groups, communities, and the state that together constitute citizen-subjects.

Table 1. Framing citizenship: evaluating Jesus’ situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domains of citizenship</th>
<th>Normative foundations of citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries</td>
<td>States can set rules of entry to and exclusion from the territory and society. The parents did not follow rules. It is appropriate to deport violators and/or to deny benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights and responsibilities</td>
<td>Jesus was not responsible for the actions of his parents. Parents have fulfilled other responsibilities of citizenship. Jesus should be allowed in-state tuition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 Citizen-subjects

The framings of citizenship in law and in normative debates suggest different ideas about who is, who should be, who can be a citizen, and how they can be citizens; by extension, they are also about who is not, should not, and cannot be a citizen. If the distribution of membership and citizenship are primary activities undertaken by human communities, as Walzer (1983) argues, then questions about who can be a member are of critical importance, for all kinds of reasons. They are important because membership in communities offers access to resources held by communities, but also because the denial of membership will have ethical and material implications that shape the quality of democracy within and across communities. Not surprisingly, then, questions about membership have been at the root of many struggles and are experienced in the daily lives of individuals and families attempting to maintain some level of well-being that is the holy grail of democratic citizenship.

Struggles to extend membership are almost invariably group struggles (Phillips, 2007; Shklar, 1991). The history of suffrage, for instance, is one in which people have struggled on behalf of groups – not on behalf of specific individuals – to be included in the electorate (Ryan, 1992). Yet many theories of citizenship and debates about extending membership conceptualize individual citizens qua individuals, as the iconic figures of citizenship (Anderson, 2006; Meehan, 1995). So we are left in the contradictory situation in which individuals are extended rights of citizenship because their membership in a particular group makes them worthy of membership in the polity. Yet as individuals, they exercise those rights irrespective of whether they identify as a group member or their personal virtues and capabilities. A young person born in the United States, for instance, is not granted the right to vote because he or she is shown to be of good moral character or because he or she has demonstrated the ability and willingness to participate in public deliberation. That young person can claim the right to vote – and other rights of citizenship – when he or she turns 18 years of age, because he or she has become a member of a group that is granted particular rights that will be exercised by individuals.

Why is this significant? First, while citizenship rights might be extended to groups, they are often withdrawn from individuals. In many places, for instance, failure to vote in successive elections leads to individuals being dropped from electoral rolls; commission of serious crimes can also disqualify people from voting and from claiming other social rights. Conversely, it is rare that a class of citizens has rights withdrawn, and even rarer that their rights are withdrawn as a result of actions of an individual. Second, immigrants have often been treated differently than other group members when citizenship is extended. Jesus, for instance, was not able to vote when he turned 18, because his membership in the group ‘alien’ trumped his membership in the group ‘age of majority’. And in situations where membership is made possible for immigrants through changes in rules that affect the group, individuals typically must show they qualify, often by passing some sort of naturalization test or interview.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this suggests the importance of understanding citizenship as based on relationships between individuals, social groups, communities, and the state. Many of the arguments just recounted rest on an idea of citizenship as a status signifying membership that is conferred by law. Citizenship, however, is more than a status. It is also a feeling and a practice that is conditioned by law, but not reducible to it (Benhabib, 2004; Ho, 2010). As Osler and Starkey (2005) argue, some of the most important practices that inscribe the status of citizen are practices of living in a community and engaging with others; these are, in short, the practices of daily life. Again using immigrants as an example, laws
clearly demarcate an individual’s alienage (Bosniak, 2006), thus limiting their ability to participate in public life or perhaps to earn a living, but law does not fully determine the way in which an individual will live in a place. Social norms and mores, interactions with other people, the demonstration of respect for difference, and a host of other social practices may make an immigrant (or any other individual, for that matter) feel more or less welcome and embraced by a community. Those same norms, interactions, and practices may lead some members of a community to make immigrants feel <i>un</i>welcome. How individuals are positioned relative to other people in the community and with respect to the community as a whole – the social order, in other words – can create permeable boundaries of legal and social inclusion whereby some people will be seen as members under certain conditions or by certain people, and will be seen as outsiders under other conditions or by other people. These feelings of belonging are not reducible to legal status, or simply to ‘objective’ social and personal characteristics. This is why supporters of Jesus and his family could argue that family members were citizens, even though they lacked formal legal standing. Their subjectivities were constructed in and through a series of relationships, including relationships that incorporated the family in the community of citizens.

It is hard to overstate the importance of affective relationships in the ways in which citizenship is constructed. Citizens can be theorized and idealized as purely rational and as unencumbered, but citizenship as practiced, lived, and ordered is anything <i>but</i> unencumbered. The vitriolic debates and fear-mongering about some types of people, the tendency to draw boundaries and harden the edges around polities, and the acceptance of practices that deny liberties to some people are difficult to explain from the perspective of the idealized (and probably stereotyped) rational, unencumbered citizen. Similarly, it is difficult to understand why there is any support at all for extending the rights of citizenship to people who are not seen as members of a polity unless relationships of obligation, mutuality, and interdependence are reckoned with. In these examples, affective relationships are intertwined with law, and the relationships between them undergird both the subjectivities of citizens and the places in which citizenship is lived. These relationships also connect citizens in one place to citizens in other places.

4 The spatiality of citizenship

The spatiality of citizenship is important both in theoretical and in practical terms. Theoretically, one would expect citizenship to be located in the sites where commitments to the polity and to other citizens and self-development can best be encouraged (Bauböck, 1994; Delanty, 2003). Practically, structures of governance mean that territorialized forms of citizenship are the most feasible way to regulate citizens for particular ends and to create institutional forms that citizens can access to make claims. But as we argued with regard to the spatiality of law and legal systems, what seems so clear on the surface is much more complex in practice.

Much of the literature seems to assume that the ‘natural’ location of citizenship is in the nation state, even though there is little basis for this linkage in most theories (Bosniak, 2006). The reason for this linkage has to do with the roles that constitutions, law, and jurisprudence have played in the past 250 years in giving citizenship particular institutional and national forms. But in recent decades there have been several arguments – in academic texts and in public debates – about the changing territoriality of citizenship that has accompanied globalization, migration, and the development of human rights regimes (Bauböck, 1994; Brubaker, 2001; Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2006; Jacobson, 1996; Smith and Bakker, 2008; Soysal, 1994; Staeheli and Nagel, 2006). The effect of these trends,
advocates often argue, is to challenge national citizenship in important ways (Appadurai, 1996). Globalization and the temporally coincident rise of what has been called ‘neoliberal governance’ is often linked to the reduced capacity and willingness of national governments to support the social rights of citizenship, such as welfare provision (Ward and Gleditsch, 2004). International migration is linked with new binational, transnational, and even cosmopolitan or postnational conceptualizations of citizenship that reflect the ways in which migrants develop multiple attachments to countries and that challenge assumptions about the linkage between citizenship and a single, territorially rooted nation state (Smith and Bakker, 2008; Soysal, 1994). Finally, the supranational institutions associated with human rights and international governance provide an additional, higher jurisdiction in which citizens can press claims, and, it is argued, may lead to instrumental notions of citizenship in which rights are prioritized over identification, obligation, and responsibility (Brubaker, 2001). Citizenship, from this perspective, seems not to involve a deep sense of membership nor to rely on bonds between citizens.

Despite – or perhaps because of – these challenges, many states have reinforced their borders, more tightly bounding their territories and controlling the population within them. Young (2003) argues that states play on the insecurities that accompany globalization and economic and social change, using those fears to justify the creation of protectionist security states. But rather than limit border enforcement to the boundaries of the state, new technologies have created border zones within countries (Nevins, 2002). Winders (2007), for instance, has documented how border enforcement has moved into the interior of the USA and is enacted through state agencies that grant driving licenses and institutions that are tasked with monitoring financial transactions. In addition, local and state governments in the USA have played more prominent roles in immigration policing since 9/11, thus effectively pushing the border inward (Coleman, 2007; Varsanyi, 2008). These legal technologies are enhanced by biometric technologies that locate borders and boundary enforcement in the bodies of individuals no matter what citizenship is attached to them (Amoore, 2006; Sparke, 2006). The significance of these monitoring technologies for the territoriality of citizenship is that individuals are subject to disciplining – and, in the case of immigrants, to detention and deportation – no matter where they may be. For citizens and non-citizens alike, the fear of discipline can have indirect effects on the public exercise of rights associated with citizenship, such as protest, or a host of mundane acts associated with daily life, such as sending money to family members. In this sense, the security state that is justified by fear is enhanced by an internalized sense of fear that regulates the exercise of citizenship in a reordered border zone that reaches beyond the legal border and into the spaces of the home and community.

The spatiality of citizenship involves more than its location in a particular (national) territory, however. Citizenship is also located in communities and the everyday practices of citizenship. Such a conceptualization reflects two reinforcing conditions. It recognizes the ways in which cohabitation and the relationships developed in place can enhance a feeling of mutuality, obligation, and care on the part of individuals toward each other that, somewhat romantically, can be the basis of community and polity (Osler and Starkey, 2005). In seeming contradiction, however, fears of migrants’ multiple attachments and their transnational/translocal ties are used to justify communities’ suspicion toward migrant neighbours. Those who view themselves as rightfully belonging to a place and nation state (by birthright citizenship or long-term residency) question the loyalties of those who maintain ties to an ‘elsewhere’. Locally and nationally based communities, thus, often use...
migrants’ complex sociospatial practices as grounds for exclusion.

These arguments and policies have important, but complex, spatial bases and a bewildering variety of implications (and interpretations). For instance, governments often argue that local provision of services—the social rights of citizenship—allows greater flexibility to meet the specific needs of individuals (Fyfe and Miligan, 2003; Trudeau, 2008). But there are competing claims that pushing responsibility for providing the social rights of citizenship onto localities diminishes the rights themselves, as the localities with the greatest needs will be least able to meet those needs (Amin, 2004). Some people argue that fostering an affective sense of citizenship—rooted in mutuality, responsibility, membership, belonging, and care—is most easily accomplished at the local level through residence and engagement with the places of daily life (Barber, 1998; Kemmis, 1995). But there are counter-arguments that local provision of services may make it less likely that needed services will be extended to ‘newcomers’, particularly when the newcomers are culturally or socially different. There are further questions about whether deeper engagement with struggles in neighbourhoods and communities will foster a localism that eschews broader political struggles and entraps citizens in narrowly circumscribed communities. Still other people argue that local activism and citizenship can highlight the structural inequalities of capitalist development and represent efforts to promote more radical democratic possibilities that extend beyond localities (Purcell, 2008).

That many of the debates just recounted are waged using competing examples from local case studies suggests a further element of citizenship’s spatiality, and the uneven development of capacities to construct a form of citizenship with particular qualities or connectivities. One can ask, for instance, why some localities and states are willing to advance legislation that extends social rights to undocumented immigrants such as Jesus or to build alliances between migrant and non-migrant workers (Sziarto and Leitner, 2010). By the same token, one can ask why it is that other states and localities have passed or attempted to pass legislation that curtails the freedoms of migrants (Wallace, 2011). It is quite possible—and even likely—that migrants become a scapegoat for other problems facing a locality (Honig, 2001). For example, Alabama passed legislation in 2011 that severely restricts immigrants’ rights. Some people have expressed surprise that a state with a small migrant population would enter the firestorm of debates over migrant rights; critics, however, argue that politicians are using the law to construct undocumented immigrants as the cause of Alabama’s dire economic situation and high unemployment rates. Yet such analyses raise further questions. Walker and Leitner (2011), for instance have shown that local governments in the same state or metropolitan area can enact both inclusionary and exclusionary laws and practices.

The varied processes that create such unevenness and seeming contradictions exist simultaneously, creating citizenships that are multi-local and polyvalent (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003). This is because all aspects of citizenship are polyvalent. Rather than being constructed through an internally consistent and reinforcing set of legal frameworks, norms, practices, and subjectivities, citizenship is an amalgamation of each, converging in some respects and contradictory in others (Bosniak, 2006: 35). We need, therefore, to understand citizenship in all its complexity, rather than in terms of its various elements. In so doing, we need to avoid the separation of legal standing from standing in communities, to eschew the distinction between formal and substantive aspects of citizenship and, instead, to look at the ways in which citizenship reflects and reinforces particular kinds of orders that structure both law and daily life. In other words, we need to understand citizenship as ordinary.
IV Conclusion: ordinariness and the daily life of citizenship

Think about citizenship from Jesus’ perspective. His story is obviously one in which law and the more formal aspects of citizenship are important. But Jesus’ life is not reducible to the law and the way it structures citizenship. There are also the bonds of membership and belonging that were activated when he was denied the scholarship and when friends agitated to draw attention to his situation, leading to the media coverage of his case. There were the opportunities he would be afforded with a college education, as well as the different opportunities he might forgo without it. Yet the feelings of obligation and bonds of care and mutuality were at some moments of secondary importance and conveyed less power than the rules surrounding his legal status. There were also arguments about his ‘true’ citizenship that were independent of legal status; this citizenship was built locally through participation, moral behaviour, and demonstrable respect and care for others in his community and school. And there are the territorial aspects of his citizenship, whereby his legal citizenship was in Mexico, a country in which he had lived less than half of his life. Citizenship was something that he had not thought of for most of his life, but that became central to him at a critical moment. All of these aspects of citizenship and the debates surrounding each of them were woven together in his life such that they became inseparable.

The taken-for-granted practices and relationships that guide our lives provide a kind of order, even as they may be difficult to pinpoint or articulate; they are part of what Waldron (2006: 83) describes as the ‘dense thicket of rules’ that sustain our collective lives. The rules he points to are only sometimes laws; they are sometimes social norms that may complement, or in some cases, be more powerful than law (p. 85). These norms guide interactions between strangers such that we can function; daily life in the world, Waldron notes, is not anarchy. As such, the citizenship of daily life is not simply constrained by law, but instead fuses law with abstract norms and the behaviors, relationships, and interactions of daily life. These interactions and encounters can lead to conflict, othering, and exclusion, but they can also lead to feelings of conviviality, to understanding, to belonging, to obligation, or to simply getting on with each other (Amin, 2002; Clayton, 2009; Gilroy, 2004; Keith, 2008; Watson, 2006). As we have argued, the ordinary, the quotidian, the everyday plays a powerful role in the way citizenship is structured, practiced, and enacted.

The addition of ‘ordinary’ to ‘citizenship’, then, highlights the importance of authority, standing, office, custom, what is commonplace and standard. This expanded conceptualization entwines legal status, norms, and systems of rule with the everyday and the unremarkable. It is always present as an ordering framework, even if we do not give it special attention until it seems to be imperilled or denied as a standing. Ordinary citizenship draws attention to the ways in which law and ordering are normalized through daily life. At the same time, the concept directs attention to the ways in which citizenship struggles – from individual to organized collective action – draw on a range of resources and claims beyond the law. These are resources and claims rooted in family, in community, and in an expanded range of moral universes; some of these claims are powerful, while others may have little purchase before the law.

In addition, the concept of ordinary allows us to consider values and rationalities beyond those generally associated with liberal democracy, that are mobilized in political debate and contestation, and that are enacted in the everyday. Situating citizenship in daily life allows other rationalities and other values to enter politics as legitimate and normal, such as values of care, mutuality, love, respect, and other-regardingness. These values
are important motivations in many struggles, and they offer a kind of power.

We have focused in this paper on migrants, but the argument extends more broadly. Values might, for instance, be part of a struggle for social justice and well-being, linking process and outcome in ways that are different than they might be in liberal theories of democracy and citizenship. Faith communities, for instance, often struggle to include their values as they take on greater roles in social service provision, roles that have been passed to them as states shed responsibility for maintaining the social rights of citizenship. Similarly, religious minorities often make the case that values rooted in faith must be seen as legitimate in democratic, inclusive societies, rather than being marginalized by secular states (Staeheli and Nagel, forthcoming). The linkages made between values, processes of citizenship formation, and social outcomes emerge from and are important to the lives of citizens and their efforts to build more democratic polities and societies. Theoretical and political arguments over citizenship need to account for those lives and values.

There are also important spatialities to ordinariness. As we have argued, the relationship between citizenship and the nation state is imperfect. Citizenship is ‘located’ or ‘mapped’ at different sites. The ways in which we live and understand citizenship are not fully defined by nation states, even though its institutions are important. Homes (whether where an individual currently lives or elsewhere), families, neighborhoods, villages, cities, and countries are all important to the geography of citizenship. Schools and universities are also important sites of citizenship formation, as they are sites where youth – who are not generally or completely granted the status of formal citizenship – explore the possibilities and relevance of citizenship in their daily lives and for their futures. Schools and universities, for example, became sites where aspects of care and justice were mobilized in support of Jesus. Communities that are not easily mapped or that might be described as placeless, such as cyber-communities or activist networks, also require further attention, as the Arab Spring demonstrates. We need to explore a more complete geography of citizenship that includes the geographies of daily life and of attachment. This more complete geography needs to include the obvious and institutionalized spaces of citizenship – such as public spaces, schools, and places of government – as well as citizenship’s hidden spaces – such as homes, workplaces, and houses of worship. It needs to include feelings of belonging to localities – both ‘here’ and ‘there’ – and to multiple communities and to the broader world. It also, however, needs to include the connections and networks that link the different sites of citizenship. The protests that are part of the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring, for instance, may take place on the street, but they are grounded in the conditions of daily life in homes and communities, and linked to other sites through complex personal and virtual networks. The sites we have mentioned do not exist in isolation, and so conceptualizations of the spatiality of citizenship needs to include the relations and flows through which the sites are connected and through which the everyday and the law are enacted.

The geography of ordinary citizenship, then, is really the geography of sociospatial relationships, including political and economic relationships. Too often, citizenship is described as something that is unencumbered by social relationships and that is both a social and a geographic equalizer. Citizenship is anything but that. It is not everywhere the same. Citizenship varies across place, across time, and for different people. It is inseparable from the geographies of communities and the networks and relationships that link them, with their attendant inequalities, imperfections, and opportunities.
Citizenship is constructed in part through the geographies of our lives, and so cannot equalize or transcend our differences.

As a way of understanding citizenship, our insistence on its ordinariness – its commonness and its ordering function – builds a messiness and untidiness into theoretical arguments. Yet this approach recognizes and incorporates the contingencies that are an ineluctable element of citizenship. To say that ordinariness imposes an order does not mean it is everywhere and always the same. Order is continually challenged and contested in large and small ways, through law, through custom, and through the practicalities of everyday life; these challenges are the source of the disorder, of change large and small, that we see over time and that are part of the spatiality of citizenship. Ordinary citizenship, thus, focuses scholarly attention on the ways in which a variety of agents, drawing on different forms of power, negotiate the frameworks that order lives, communities and societies. In this way, and as Jesus experienced it, citizenship is both ordinary and extraordinary.

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Notes
1. In the USA, each of the 50 states runs its own university system. In most cases, lower fees are charged for students from the state than for students who come from out of the state. Out-of-state tuition at the University of Colorado was about 600% more than in-state tuition at that time.
2. Activism and legislation on this issue has been accelerating since 2010, meaning we cannot address specific changes in the paper; our description of the legislation will undoubtedly be dated by the time the paper is published.
3. For an overview of these debates, and excerpts from major works, see Shafir (1998). For reviews within geography, see Isin and Wood (1999), Kofman (2003), and Staeheli (2011).
4. It is for this reason that much of the discussion about law and legality is centred on the US system. We attempt, however, to make broader points about law and legality, of which the US experience is simply an example.
5. Our thanks to one anonymous reviewer for reminding us of this.

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