Growth and Decline of Muslim Hui Enclaves in Beijing

Wenfei Wang, Shangyi Zhou, and C. Cindy Fan

Abstract: The Hui people are a distinct ethnic group in China in terms of their diet and Islamic religion. In this paper, we examine the divergent residential and economic development of Niujie and Madian, two Hui enclaves in the city of Beijing. Our analysis is based on archival and historical materials, census data, and information collected from recent field work. We show that in addition to social perspectives, geographic factors—location relative to the northward urban expansion of Beijing, and the character of urban administrative geography in China—are important for understanding the evolution of ethnic enclaves. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: O10, I31, J15. 3 figures, 2 tables, 60 references.

INTRODUCTION

Research on ethnic enclaves has focused on their residential and economic functions and on the social explanations for their existence and persistence. Most studies do not address the role of geography or the evolution of ethnic enclaves, including their decline. In this paper, we examine Niujie and Madian, two Muslim Hui enclaves in Beijing, their history, and recent divergent paths of development. While Niujie continues to thrive as a major residential area of the Hui people in Beijing and as a prominent supplier of Hui foods and services for the entire city, both the Islamic character and the proportion of Hui residents in Madian have declined. We argue that Madian’s location with respect to recent urban expansion in Beijing and the administrative geography of the area have contributed to the enclave’s decline. While both factors reflect the peculiarities of China’s urban geography, our case study underscores the importance of geographic, in addition to social, perspectives for understanding the evolution of urban neighborhoods.

In this paper, we draw on archival and historical materials, census data, and materials gathered and observations made during field work in the summer of 2000, in December 2001, and January 2002. In the following two sections, we review the literature’s major findings on the existence of ethnic enclaves, their changes over time, and geography. They are followed by brief accounts of ethnic enclaves in China, the history of Muslim Hui in China, and ethnic enclaves in Beijing. We then examine Niujie and Madian, focusing on their...
history and their divergent residential and economic development in recent years. A summary of the study’s major findings concludes the paper.

THE BASES OF ETHNIC ENCLAVES

A large body of work, mostly in the English language, has examined ethnic enclaves in relation to ethnicity, immigration, the labor market, and urban ecology. The research is especially rich on countries such as the United States, where large cities are racially and ethnically diverse and where immigration has accelerated the emergence and expansion of ethnic communities. In this literature, ethnic enclaves are commonly defined as “highly visible geographically or spatially bounded ethnic centers” in cities (Ong, 1993). Chinatowns, for example, are among the most prominent and well researched ethnic enclaves in U.S. cities.

Research on immigrant minorities in the United States has highlighted the residential, social, and economic functions of ethnic enclaves. Historically, enclaves such as Chinatowns have served as Chinese immigrants’ initial destinations, buffers that ease their adjustments, sources of social networks, bases for ethnic solidarity, and means of their livelihoods (Wu, 1958; Wong, 1988; Zhou, 1992; Ong, 1993; Fong, 1994). Ethnic enclaves also are loci of economic activities heavily involved with and serving the ethnic community. Light and Bonacich (1988) noted that the concept of ethnic enclave centers on an institutionally complete ethnic community and its economic base. Focusing on New York’s Chinatown, Zhou (1992, pp. 96-97) argued that “no longer does Chinatown serve only as a home for immigrant Chinese in New York metropolitan area, it has become a consolidated community based on an increasingly strong ethnic economy.”

Studies on the United States have found that immigrant minorities who are confronted with barriers in the mainstream labor market are attracted to economic activities, including self-employment, that serve the ethnic community and that face little competition from the dominant group (e.g., Ong, 1993). In so doing, they reinforce an “ethnic economy,” in which ethnicity-based networks facilitate the financing, supply, labor, and information requirements of businesses. Waldinger (1989) noted that access to immigrant resources provides the impetus for ethnic entrepreneurship in immigrant enclaves. These ethnic businesses are not necessarily geographically bounded and may serve a large and general market. An “ethnic enclave economy,” on the other hand, refers to economic activities facilitated by the access to a labor force and a consumption market associated with the ethnic enclave. Many scholars have emphasized the importance of the ethnic economy and ethnic enclave economy to maintaining and strengthening ethnic enclaves (e.g., Zhou, 1992).

Much attention also has been devoted to social explanations for the persistence of ethnic enclaves. Most studies emanating from the Chicago School subscribe to the logic that social relations are correlated with spatial relations and that social distance is correlated with physical distance (e.g., Burgess, 1925; Park, 1926, 1952; Darden, 1985–1986). According to this view, the residential patterns of ethnic and racial groups are a function of the social distances between them and of their socioeconomic statuses. Stemming from this view is the notion that socioeconomic advancement by ethnic minorities will lead to their assimilation into mainstream society and thereby reduce their residential segregation (e.g., Massey and Denton, 1985; Denton and Massey, 1988). In other words, the impetus for ethnic enclaves will disappear as the ethnic community’s socioeconomic status advances. This perspective, however, does not explain the persistence of residential segregation among middle-class ethnic minorities or the emergence of ethnic suburbs (e.g., Li, 1998, 1999; Fan, 2002b). Clark (1986, 1992) argued that preference (for own race/own ethnicity) must be taken into
consideration, in addition to socioeconomic status. Other researchers have highlighted the role of discrimination by covenants, realtors, and financial institutions (Galster, 1988). In addition, researchers have identified strong ethnic identity as a prominent factor facilitating group members’ adaptation to changing exigencies without losing group cohesiveness, thus helping to maintain the persistence of community (e.g., Fugita and O’Brien, 1991).

THE EVOLUTION AND GEOGRAPHY OF ETHNIC ENCLAVES

Although much attention has been focused on defining ethnic enclaves and understanding the circumstances under which they came into being, relatively little work has been done on their changes over time and their geography. Research on Irish and Italian communities in the United States has emphasized their assimilation. By comparing five ethnic groups in Boston, one such study found that the assimilation of the Irish and the Italians into the American mainstream was accompanied by a decline of their original urban enclaves (Action for Boston Community Development, 1972). Research by Nelli (1970) and Snyder (1996) further highlighted the roles of neighborhoods and community institutions.

The impacts of policy are equally important. For example, studies of Chinese communities in the United States have demonstrated how changes in immigration policy have transformed the demographic, social, and economic character of Chinatowns (Wong, 1988; Zhou, 1992; Lin, 1998). Specifically, Chinese immigration to the United States was suspended between the late 19th century and 1965 by exclusionary legislation, a period during which New York’s Chinatown was “frozen” into virtually a bachelor society. The 1965 U.S. Immigration Act lifted race-based exclusion and prioritized family reunification, contributing not only to the increased volume of Chinese immigrants but also to the evolution of Chinatowns into family-centered immigrant enclaves. Recent work by Li (1998, 1999), for example, has traced the impacts of post-1965 Chinese immigration and increased globalization on the emergence of Chinese ethnic suburbs (ethnoburbs) in Los Angeles.

The literature on ethnic communities tends to emphasize their social and economic attributes more than their geography, although some researchers have examined the relations between location, place, and ethnic economies. Zhou (1998) studied how local contexts in Los Angeles and New York shaped the development of immigrant communities. Kaplan (1998) argued that spatial location operates as a defined resource that may enhance the prospects of ethnic businesses. Razin and Light (1998) illustrated the combined effects of location and ethnicity on self-employment. Studies on Chinatowns again have shed some light on the geography of ethnic enclaves. The traditional Chinatowns are almost always located near the downtown area of large cities. Such a location, however, has made the enclaves vulnerable to impacts associated with urban expansion. The Chinatown of Los Angeles, for example, was forced to relocate twice because of downtown-related urban development, including the construction of a railroad station (e.g., Cheng and Kwok, 1988). Moreover, congestion and high rent near downtown areas undermine the attractiveness of Chinatowns, especially when compared to suburban locations with lower housing prices and better living conditions (Li, 1999). As a whole, however, research on ethnic enclaves has not emphasized the role of geography. In our case study, we shall bring to the fore the impacts of urban expansion and administrative geography on ethnic enclaves.
ETHNIC ENCLAVES IN CHINA

The conditions under which ethnic enclaves have emerged in China are quite different from those in the West. First, in quantitative terms, China is a highly homogeneous society, where ethnic minorities account for only a small proportion of the population. Although that proportion has increased from 6.6 percent in 1982 to 8.0 percent in 1990 and 8.8 percent in 1995, largely due to the differential population growth rates between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese, it is still much smaller than the proportions of ethnic minorities in the United States and in most Western nations. Second, immigration is extremely low in China. Unlike in the United States, Canada, Australia, and other countries with significant numbers of immigrants, ethnic enclaves in China are not tied to or replenished by newly arrived immigrants. Third, the spatial patterns of ethnic minorities in China are closely connected to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s “minority nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) policy (Lipman, 1997, p. xxi). Specifically, the Chinese government officially recognizes 55 of all non-Han ethnic groups present in China as “minority nationalities,” and has designated “autonomous regions” that receive financial subsidies and where minorities are given more opportunities in political representation and decision making. Indeed, most ethnic minorities in China are concentrated in autonomous regions in the country’s northern, northwestern, and southwestern peripheries. In part because of the small proportions of minorities in China, urban ethnic enclaves in eastern China are on average smaller in size and in spatial extent than are ethnic enclaves in the United States.

The state continues to play a prominent role in China. Government policy, therefore, is an important factor of the development of ethnic enclaves. Both Gladney (1998) and Zhou (1997) have highlighted the impacts of policy on Hui enclaves in Beijing. Gladney (1998) documented how the state’s favorable policy toward ethnic minorities has influenced urban Hui’s ethno-religious identity in the city, and Zhou (1997) illustrated the effects of administrative geography. More specifically, Zhou argued that an enclave’s development is facilitated if it is located wholly within one administrative district. The effects of administrative divisions are not unique to China, but perhaps are manifest more distinctly there than in most other countries, primarily because Chinese cities inherit a rigid hierarchical administrative system extending down to the neighborhood and household levels. We shall not describe this system in detail here, as it has been elaborated elsewhere (e.g., Ma and Cui, 1987; Chan, 1994, p. 22). Suffice it to say, the street administrative office (jiedao banshi chu) that manages resident committees (juweihui) has the power to oversee the residential and economic development of urban neighborhoods. In this paper, we extend Zhou’s argument and illustrate with our case study that enclaves that have their own street administrative offices are more likely to have their interests, especially ethnic identity, represented in urban development plans.

Given differences between the Chinese and Western (especially U.S.) circumstances, the Western literature on ethnic enclaves may not be directly applicable to China. That said, insights from the Western literature do indeed inform our understanding of China’s ethnic enclaves. First, ethnic enclaves in China are associated with an ethnic enclave economy, which is closely connected with the spatial concentration of the ethnic community, as well as

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2The most recently available data on minority populations in China are from the 1990 Census and the 1995 One Percent Sample Survey. The latter reports that in 1995 the total number of ethnic minorities in China was 108,460,000 (State Council News Agency, 2000). To date respective data from the 2000 Census are not yet available. Judging from the higher rates of population growth among ethnic minorities, however, their proportions have likely increased during the second half of the 1990s.
an ethnic economy whose spatial extent penetrates beyond the enclave. Second, the social distance between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese, and ethnic identity among the minorities, are factors in the persistence of ethnic enclaves. Third, the evolution of ethnic enclaves in China is shaped by urban expansion. Since they are generally small in size, they are especially vulnerable to development forces that turn accessible areas into modern, mainstream, and built-up landscapes. In this paper, we argue that enclaves facing strong forces of urban expansion have, compared to those in more peripheral areas, diminished prospects for survival.

HISTORY OF MUSLIM HUI IN CHINA

The Hui people are Muslims and are not only an ethnic group but also a religious group. They are descendants of Persian, Arab, Mongolian, and Turkish Muslim merchants, soldiers, and officials who settled in China and intermarried with local Chinese (Gladney, 1991). The term Hui originated from the Mandarin word “Huihui,” a term first used in the Yuan dynasty (1276–1368) to describe Central Asian, Persian, and Arab residents in China (Lipman, 1997). The first Muslims, and with them Islam, came to China during the middle of the seventh century. They included nomadic groups in Central Asia who converted to Islam and settled in northwestern China. Also, Arabian and Persian merchants who traveled via the sea routes around India soon found the Chinese trade sufficiently profitable to justify their permanent presence in Chinese coastal cities. As a result, during the seventh century large Muslim communities emerged in Yangzhou (Jiangsu), Canton (Guangdong), and in the ports of Fujian (Israeli, 1982). During the tenth century, Muslim migration into China reached its peak. In those earlier times, Muslims lived apart from local Chinese in separate quarters and maintained different systems of laws and ways of life. Their seclusion was made possible by the virtual extraterritorial rights they enjoyed. Eventually, many Muslim men married Han women and some adopted Han children in times of famine. Intermarriage not only enabled the numerical growth of the Hui people but also increased their assimilation into the Chinese mainstream society (Israeli, 1982).

Despite the long history of the Hui people in China, they remain a clearly defined minority group. Although they speak the same dialect as local Han and most Hui are physically indistinguishable from Han Chinese, their diet, religion, and other customs set them apart. Exclusion of pork from the Hui people’s diet is a formidable barrier to their interactions with Han Chinese, especially since food is so central to social life in China (Gamble, 1921). Hui culture largely centers on Islam. For example, the concept of qingzhen embodies ritual cleanliness and good moral conduct as well as authenticity and legitimacy (Gladney, 1991, p. 13). The Hui communities center around the mosque. Believers of Islam pray five times a day, beginning at 5 a.m., when an imam on the Bangkelou (tower) gathers Muslims around the mosque to come to worship. Ceremonies such as naming of the infants, circumcision, weddings, and funerals, are held at the mosque. During festivals such as Qurban and Ramadan, many Hui people dress up and gather at mosques (Gladney, 1998). In addition, Islamic food stalls and Quran book stores tend to agglomerate near mosques. The existence of a mosque is therefore an indicator of the presence or previous presence of a Hui community.

Within the PRC, the Hui community comprises all Muslims who do not have their own specific language and are not registered as members of the other nine officially recognized Muslim minorities (Black et al., 2001). Since the 1950s, a Han person who converted to Islam would not become a Hui, because the latter is a minority nationality category rather

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3These are Boan, Dongxiang, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tatar, Tajik, Uygur, and Uzbek.
than one solely based on religion (Lipman, 1997, p. xxiii). The Hui people are one of the largest minority nationalities in China, accounting for 10.9 percent of the nation’s minority population in 1982 and 9.5 percent in 1990 (State Statistical Bureau, 1999).4 The total number of Hui in 1990 was 8.6 million. Because reports from the 1995 One Percent Sample Survey do not document minority breakdowns and because minority data from the 2000 Census are not yet available, most researchers continue to use the 1990 figures (e.g., Black et al., 2001). However, if we assume that the proportion of Hui among all minorities remained the same between 1990 and 1995 (9.5 percent), then the total number of Hui in 1995 would have been 10.3 million, or 0.8 percent of China’s total population of 1.2 billion (see also note 2).

The Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in north-central China, one of five autonomous regions in the country, has the highest concentration of Hui, who accounted for 32.9 percent of the region’s population in 1990. Hui also accounted for significant proportions of the population in Qinghai (8.3 percent), Gansu (6.4 percent), and Xinjiang (5.0 percent), all inland provinces. At the same time, the Hui people are among the most dispersed ethnic minorities in China. As shown in Figure 1, Ningxia and Gansu each accounted for at least 10 percent of the Hui people in China, and Qinghai, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Liaoning, Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin,

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4As noted earlier, minorities accounted for 8.0 percent of China’s total population in 1990. The Hui people were the third largest minority in 1990, after Zhuang (17.2 percent of the total minority population) and Manchu (10.9 percent). The predominantly Muslim Uyghur accounted for 8.0 percent of China’s minority population (State Statistical Bureau, 1999).
Shandong, Henan, and Fujian each accounted for at least 2 percent of China’s Hui population. The Hui people are especially highly represented among minorities in urban areas. For example, according to the 1990 Census, Hui accounted for half of all the ethnic minorities in Beijing (Zhang, 1993).

The presence of Hui in large urban areas in part reflects their business acumen and propensity for commerce-related migration. The Hui people are noted for their skills in small businesses—in particular, Islamic (qingzhen) restaurants and fur, leather, and jade processing. Over the centuries, their engagement in commerce often has resulted in their migration to different parts of the country. Gladney (1991, 1998), for example, has argued that Hui identity is tied to trade and entrepreneurship and shows that significant proportions of the Hui people in urban areas are engaged in business. Historically, the Hui people have had lower levels of education than Han Chinese (e.g., Xiang, 1999). Table 1 shows that, according to China’s 1990 Census, 32.8 percent of the Hui people ages 6 and over were illiterate or semi-illiterate, compared with less than 20 percent among Han Chinese and 30.3 percent among other minorities. The Hui people’s lower education is likely to pose a disadvantage for them in the urban labor market, and may be a reason for their high representation in urban trade and commerce.

Largely because of their diet and the importance of the mosque to the Hui community, the Hui people in large cities tend to concentrate in enclaves that are segregated from Han Chinese. In other words, the social distance between the Hui people and Han Chinese has been a factor contributing to the persistence of Hui enclaves. This type of social distance is not only a function of socioeconomic status but is most importantly tied to deep-rooted ethnic identity, traditions, and religion. Even though the Hui people have lived in these cities for many generations, they are still perceived by the Han locals as outsiders (Xiong, 1993). The economic activities in the Hui enclaves, especially those involving Islamic food service and processing, and mosque-related commodities and services, serve not only residents in the enclaves but also Hui that live outside the enclaves. In this respect, the ethnic economy of the Hui enclaves penetrates beyond the enclaves’ boundaries. On the other hand, the enclave’s economic activities clearly constitute an ethnic enclave economy. Specifically, the Hui enclaves are highly visible geographically, and in most cases have well defined boundaries within the city. Economic activities in the enclave have access to a specific ethnic-based labor force and a market for consumption largely within the enclave. As the economic activities of the enclave are so strongly tied to the Hui people living there, the economic and residential functions of the enclave are mutually interdependent. In other words, the well-being of the ethnic enclave economy affects the concentration of the Hui people in the enclave, and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attainment</th>
<th>Han</th>
<th>Hui</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate/semi-illiteratea</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior high school or above</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*aIlliterate and semi-illiterate refers to individuals who cannot read or can recognize less than 1,500 words.

Source: Calculated by authors from 1990 Census of China, one percent sample (provided by the National Information Center).
reciprocally, the concentration of the Hui people in the enclave influences the prominence and survival of the ethnic enclave economy there.

ETHNIC ENCLAVES IN BEIJING

Like most large cities in China, Beijing has over its history received a large number of migrants from different parts of the country, including not only ethnic minorities but also Han migrants. These migrants and their descendants have given rise to geographically distinguishable ethnic centers in the city similar to enclaves in Western cities. The enclaves in Beijing can be roughly collapsed into two major types. First, many past or present Hui communities across Beijing can be documented, as evidenced by the existence of more than 40 mosques in and outside the city proper (Gladney, 1998) (Fig. 2). Some of these enclaves have disappeared, but a few continue to thrive. The Hui people have been living in the city for generations, and therefore most are not considered migrants but are official Beijing residents.
and are regarded as “Beijingers” or “Beijingese.” They consider Beijing, and the Hui enclaves, to be their permanent home. However, socially and spatially, they are highly segregated from Han Chinese. Compared to Hui, the Xinjiang Uyghur are more recent migrants and their enclaves (e.g., Xinjiang Village) are much smaller in size.

Second, because of the influx of rural labor migrants to Beijing during the last two decades, many other native place–based enclaves have emerged (Ma and Xiang, 1998; Xiang, 2000), such as Zhejiang Village and Henan Village. Migrants who live there came to Beijing to earn a living, but do not have permanent residence rights in the city. They are considered outsiders to the city because of their primarily rural backgrounds, low socioeconomic status, and lack of permanent residence (Fan, 2002a). Even though most of them are Han Chinese, their low status in the city connotes a native place–based ethnicity distinct from the urbanites (Honig, 1996), and in this regard they are similar to the urban Hui. Unlike the Hui people, however, these temporary migrants do not consider Beijing to be their permanent home, and most plan to eventually return to their home towns or villages (Xiang, 2000). As migrants leave their enclaves to pursue work elsewhere or to return to their native places, they are replaced by new migrants freshly entering urban work. To the Hui people, on the other hand, their enclaves have more permanent meanings and are not as readily replenished by new migrants. The survival of their enclaves is, therefore, solely dependent on the existing Hui residents and communities.

Compared to the scholarly and public attention given to temporary migrants and their enclaves, relatively little research has been done on Hui communities and their enclaves. Most studies on Hui focus on inland provinces, especially Ningxia, and very little attention has been given to the eastern and more developed parts of China. For example, Chen (2000) analyzed the spatial structure of urban Hui enclaves in Ningxia. Using sample and questionnaire surveys, Ma and Jing (1997) examined the residential transition of Hui communities in Yinchuan city, the provincial capital of Ningxia. They emphasized the social and psychological impacts of urban expansion on urban Hui and found that older Hui people have been affected more than younger Hui. Despite these works, researchers have largely ignored an important feature of urban Hui enclaves—that many have disappeared over time. Those left standing continue to serve Hui communities and sustain the ethnic and ethnic enclave economy. Through an analysis and comparison of two Hui enclaves in Beijing, we seek to examine the reasons for the varied fates of these enclaves. We argue that urban expansion and administrative geography are among the most important factors influencing the divergent paths of development of urban ethnic enclaves in China.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NIUJIE AND MADIAN

History, Location, and Economic Activities of Niujie

Niujie is one of the largest Hui enclaves in Beijing, and is located in the southwestern part of the city (Fig. 2). The estimated population of the Niujie district5 in 2000 was 64,059, with 21.9 percent of the residents being of Hui ethnicity. The population of Niujie’s core area6 was 24,088, among whom 54.1 percent were Hui. Historical documents and archival

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5Niujie district is an urban administrative unit managed by the Niujie Street Administrative Office. We obtained the estimated data from our interviews with officials of that office.
6The core area of the Niujie enclave is along “Niujie” or Oxen Street, which has higher concentration of Hui than the rest of the district.
research indicate that from as early as the Tang dynasty (618–907), the location of today’s Niujie had been on the periphery of the city of Beijing (Yu, 1981; Zhen, 1982; Tada, 1986; Weng, 1992). Like most larger Hui communities in Beijing, Niujie has its own mosque, which was built between 916 and 1125 (Fig. 3). The gravestones of two imams in the mosque suggest that a sizable number of the Hui people lived there as early as the Yuan dynasty (Liu, 1990). The origins of the settlement probably were related to the Muslims in Central and Western Asia who joined Genghis Khan’s army and moved eastward as Kublai Khan established the Yuan dynasty. As the capital of the Yuan dynasty, Beijing became the home of many Muslims. At the time, Niujie was called Willow River Village, which was located outside but close to the main city wall of Beijing (Fig. 2). Such peripheral location reflected separation between the Hui people living there and the Mongolian residents living within the city wall.

Han Chinese regained control over China and established the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Historical records indicate that by the Ming dynasty many Hui communities had emerged in different parts of Beijing (Liu, 1990). For defense purposes, an outer city wall was built in 1544. Although Willow River Village was within the outer city wall, it was still considered peripheral to the city proper where most Han Chinese lived.

During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), Willow River Village changed its name to Niujie. The literal translation is “Oxen Street,” which refers to the neighborhood as well as its main street. The similarity between the pronunciation of willow (liu) and oxen (niu) might have given rise to the name change. But the name Niujie was indeed descriptive of the economic activities there. By the Qing dynasty, the street was already well known for the selling of beef.

Fig. 3. Mosque at Niujie, built between 916 and 1125 A.D., and renovated in the 1980s. The top front sign reads “Niujie Mosque” and the one below reads “the good path to heaven.”
and mutton, butchered by imams. The Hui people living in Niujie, like those prior to the Qing dynasty, constituted a distinct community separate from the Manchu people, the dominant group at that time.

From the Ming dynasty until 1949, Niujie engaged in both an ethnic enclave economy serving the Hui people living there, as well as an ethnic economy serving the Hui people and other residents in the rest of Beijing. Food service was central to Niujie’s economy, including Qingzhen restaurants, Hui food stands and wagons, and beef and mutton stands. Products of Niujie were sold to the rest of the country. Residents in Niujie gained a reputation for operating meat delicatessens in other parts of Beijing. In addition to food service, Niujie also was known for the jade industry. Prior to 1949, Niujie accounted for three-quarters of the jade enterprises in Beijing (Liu, 1990). In addition, Niujie was located next to Caishikou, the largest vegetable wholesale market during the Qing dynasty. According to a popular legend, Ming emperors gave Hui soldiers living in Niujie special permission to trade agricultural products as a reward for their service, thus paving the way for their subsequent control over the wholesaling of a number of agricultural products in Beijing (Zhou, 1997).

In today’s Beijing, Niujie remains peripheral to the city’s core area of economic growth. The development of the Xuanwu district, where Niujie is located, lags behind that of the two urban districts to the north (Xicheng and Dongcheng) (Fig. 2 and Table 2). In fact, much of the recent urban expansion in Beijing has been toward the north, as evidenced by the higher GDP per capita and higher rates of economic growth in the districts of northern Beijing. As we shall elaborate later in the paper, Niujie’s relatively peripheral location has been conducive to its continued survival as an ethnic enclave.

### History, Location, and Economic Activities of Madian

Madian is located in the northern part of Beijing and is at the border between Haidian and Xicheng districts (Fig. 2). It is near the Badaling Highway, which was an important thoroughfare during the Ming and Qing dynasties. This thoroughfare played and continues to play an important role, connecting Beijing to northern Hebei province and Inner Mongolia.
The location of Madian was within the city wall during the Yuan dynasty, but it was outside the new city wall built during the Ming dynasty. Like Niujie, therefore, Madian was located in a relatively peripheral part of the city.

Historical records indicate that the Hui enclave in Madian came into being approximately 330 years ago during the Kangxi period in the Qing dynasty. In 1662, Emperor Kangxi built the very large (3,000 m²) Madian mosque. In our interview with the administrator of the Madian mosque, he remarked that Kangxi built the large mosque in Madian probably because a considerable number of Hui people already resided there.

Unlike the earliest Hui people in Niujie, who were soldiers, those in Madian were sheep and horse traders, originally from northwestern China. Turmoil in that part of China during the Qing dynasty prompted the migration of Hui eastward, and some settled in Madian. Inscriptions on old tombs in Madian depict ancestral homes (e.g., Xianyang in Shaanxi province, and Qinzhou and Pingliang in Gansu province) in northwestern China (Xue, 2000). Madian’s location near a major thoroughfare linking Beijing with points north benefited local sheep and horse traders, as they brought in animals from such places as Zhangjiakou (Hebei) and Suiyuan (Inner Mongolia) to Beijing. Other Hui residents in Madian worked in related occupations such as butchering and meat trading. Although Madian was peripheral to the core areas of the city, its favorable location with respect to the caravan route to and from Beijing contributed to the success of a large sheep and horse market and to the prosperity of the Hui residents there. The literal translation of “Ma” is horse, and suggests that the name Madian was derived from the sheep and horse market in the enclave (Gladney, 1991, p. 176). This may also be related to the large number of Hui residents in Madian whose last name is Ma (see note 7). During the Daoguang period (1821–1850), Madian sold more than 130,000 head of animals per year (Wang, 1937). Although locomotive transportation and heavy taxation during the late Republican period weakened the economy of Madian, by the 1930s the volume of the sheep trade in Madian fell within the range of 30,000 to 50,000 head annually. Madian had become a rather homogenous Muslim neighborhood, so that pork or pig traders would detour around it rather than entering the enclave (Xue, 2000). The existence of a large slaughterhouse in Madian made it the primary beef and mutton provider for the Hui people throughout Beijing up to the 1950s.

On a contemporary map of Beijing, Madian is located next to the intersection between the Badaling highway and the Third Ring highway (Fig. 2). In recent decades, road and highway construction has played an important role in Beijing’s urban expansion. The residents and economy of Madian have been affected by several major highway construction projects, in part because of the northward expansion of built-up areas and in part because of the accessibility that Madian has historically enjoyed. The old northern caravan route has been transformed into one of the main transportation axes of the city. The area surrounding Madian is ideal for accommodating the pressure on housing and commercial development space that accompanies urban expansion. In the late 1950s, for example, some Beijingers displaced by the construction of the People’s Grand Auditorium in the city’s core moved to Madian (Zhou, 1999; see note 9). During the 1980s, the construction of Dechang Road, which later became part of the Badaling highway, prompted many Hui residents to move out from Madian.

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7We interviewed Mr. Ma Yuqing in August 2000.
9This information is from Mr. Ma Yuhai, a long-time resident of Madian, whom we interviewed in August 2000. A number of Madian residents with whom we spoke recommended that we interview Mr. Ma because of his deep knowledge of the enclave’s history.
in the 1990s, construction of the Third Ring highway also led to the relocation of many Hui residents from the enclave (Zhou, 1999). In this regard, the experiences of the Hui residents there are similar to those in minority neighborhoods displaced by highway construction in U.S. cities.

In other words, highway construction has brought Madián ever closer to the city proper, making it susceptible to non-Hui residential and commercial development and further diluting the ethnic character of the enclave. Under these pressures, the city government is less willing to invest in preserving the Madián enclave than in developing the ethnic economy of the Niujie enclave, one that is relatively less affected by urban expansion. In addition, unlike Niujie, which is administered by one street administrative office, the area of Madián is under the jurisdiction of two different street administrative offices. The absence of an independent administrative body overseeing the interests of Madián’s residents likely has undermined the ethnic community, and hence the ethnic enclave.

Divergent Development Paths

During the past several decades, new forces of change have transformed the Chinese city and shaped the development of ethnic enclaves within it. Under Mao, the Chinese state was especially concerned with providing the populace with adequate food and shelter. Pressure from rapid population growth and high demand for housing prompted cities to construct new residential buildings. The economic reforms that began in the late 1970s have provided further impetus for urban economic expansion. Reform policies have emphasized economic decentralization, marketization, and increased privatization in both rural and urban areas. Although state control in many aspects of the economy remain, the reforms have given provincial and local governments greater autonomy to boost local economic development, contributing to remarkable rates of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Cities everywhere are motivated to launch urban renewal and renovation projects. In addition, reforms in property rights, including housing reforms and policies encouraging home ownership, have triggered waves of housing construction throughout Chinese cities. Residents in ethnic enclaves, like other residents in the city, have more opportunities than in the Maoist period to engage in business. City governments have also rebuilt or renovated religious buildings, such as mosques, that were destroyed or damaged during the Cultural Revolution.

These new changes, however, have had varied implications for different neighborhoods in the city. The two enclaves of Niujie and Madián, for example, have experienced divergent trajectories of development. While Niujie continues to be a thriving enclave, with a high concentration of Hui residents and economic activities, Madián has lost much of its character as a Hui enclave in terms of both residential and economic functions. As early as the Maoist period, Madián was among the sites selected for new housing construction because of its accessibility. Hence, the sheep market and slaughterhouse, which once occupied large areas in Madián, were demolished and in their places new apartments were constructed. With increased housing capacity, Madián attracted a large number of Han residents, whose influx diluted considerably the concentration of Hui in the enclave. Historical and present population numbers for Madián are not well documented, but the head of one of the resident committees that we interviewed in August 2000 estimated that the proportions of Hui in Madián were over 90 percent in the 1950s, but had declined to less than 30 percent in the 1980s and approximately 25 percent in 2000. Niujie, on the other hand, has not experienced the same level of threat from urban expansion as Madián.
Two prominent factors, both having to do with the geography of the enclaves, explain their divergent experiences. First, urban expansion in Beijing has begun to encroach upon formerly peripheral areas. As observed earlier, the northern districts of Beijing have experienced higher rates of economic growth than the rest of the city (Table 2). In particular, Haidian district, where Madian is located, had the highest level of GDP per capita (and experienced double-digit annual rates in its growth) during the second half of the 1990s. Madian’s accessibility and its location in the path of northward urban expansion have made it an excellent candidate for new residential and real estate development. Second, because the enclave is split between two different street administrative offices, the residents of Madian do not have access to a single administrative body that represents the interests of all of its residents. The enclave’s development therefore is even more vulnerable to external commercial and market forces.

Residential development since the reforms. A new political and economic climate since the reforms encouraged city governments to accelerate investment in urban development. The Beijing government has launched renovation projects throughout the city in order to improve housing conditions. Renovation in Niujie began in 1997, involving an area of 36 hectares and affecting approximately 7,500 households and 26,000 residents (Xuanwubao, 1997). By the end of 2000, the first phase of the project was completed, and approximately 3,000 households had moved into new apartment buildings. The “return rate” was as high as 90 percent—that is, the vast majority of former residents moved back into newly renovated buildings, suggesting that the concentration of the Hui people in Niujie would continue. The majority of those that decided not to return to Niujie were Han Chinese. Government policy that permitted Niujie residents to pay only a small price to move into the new apartment buildings encouraged them to remain in the enclave. Worthy of mention here is that the new apartment buildings are decorated with Islamic symbols, an indication that retaining the Hui residents was one of the objectives of the renovation project.

The second phase of renovation is scheduled to be completed in 2002. According to the master plan, the mosque will remain at its original location and will continue to mark the identity of Niujie (Xuanwubao, 1997). In addition, a large square and grassy area will be constructed around the mosque, which will likely further enhance the centrality of the mosque in the enclave. All of these developments suggest that the Niujie Street Administrative Office has played an important role in preserving the Hui character of the enclave, making it possible for the Hui residents to return and live in a setting they are highly identified with, despite urban renovation and redevelopment.

Madian’s development path has been quite different. Renovation there began in the early 1990s, with the active involvement of real estate developers, attracted by Madian’s favorable location adjacent to the northern portion of the busy Third Ring highway. These developers’ preferences, accordingly, were reflected in the blueprint for renovation. By 1993, the renovation of Madian’s Southern Village (Nancun), which was renamed Yulanyuan, was completed, centering around three seven-storey modern residential buildings lacking any Islamic characteristics. Plans for other areas within Madian, likewise, emphasize modern residential buildings. In addition, the renovation project includes a large and luxurious multifunctional building, called the CityChamp Palace, which would define the center of Madian. According to real estate advertisements, in 2000 the purchase prices of new apartments in Madian had risen to more than 10,000 yuan per square meter, beyond the affordability of most of the former residents there. Such rising real estate prices meant that in order to remain in Madian those residents displaced by the renovation had to cope with a hefty price increase or settle with reduced living spaces. In the former Southern Village, only 40 percent of displaced
residents returned, and return rates were even lower in the rest of the enclave. Most Hui residents that did not return moved to northern and northwestern parts of the city that are farther away from core areas of Beijing and where prices of housing are lower. In Madian, therefore, real estate development has turned the enclave into a relatively expensive neighborhood, reducing the concentration of Hui people there in the process.

Given these recent developments, Gladney’s (1991, p. 176) earlier observation that “….the community [Madian] continues to maintain a strong solidarity” is quickly outdated. During our field work in the summer of 2000, the former Hui residents in Madian we interviewed identified two reasons why they chose not to return after the renovation was complete, despite their wishes to do so: (1) they could not afford the high prices or were dissatisfied with the reduction in living space they would need to tolerate in order to stay; and (2) they were dismayed by the destruction of Islamic characteristics of the urban landscape as a result of the renovation. These views indicate that the renovation plans in Madian did not prioritize the preservation of ethnic character, and suggest that the city government and Madian’s street administrative offices invested little effort in retaining the area as an ethnic enclave. This may result from the absence of an administrative body dedicated to the interests of the Hui residents in Madian, and also reflects the powerful market forces of commercialization and commodification that can override any efforts toward urban preservation. The net effect is that a residential setting that the Hui people could identify with in Madian has disappeared, and hence so will the enclave in due course.

Economic development since the reforms. Economic activities in the two enclaves also reflect their different paths of development. In Niujie, traditional ethnic and ethnic enclave activities such as meat trading, Islamic restaurants, and jade processing have largely been preserved. Although there has been an increase of services such as miscellaneous repair workshops and contractors, the economy of Niujie continues to center on ethnic-specific activities. This is partly because of the role played by the Beijing city government, which endorsed the construction of large Islamic beef and mutton shops, as well as Islamic wholesale markets and restaurants, especially along Nanhengxi Street, a major commercial artery in Niujie. We conducted a survey in January 2002 and found that there were more than 30 Islamic restaurants on Nanhengxi Street, where the shops and market sold approximately 6,000 kg of beef and mutton a day. These activities have further consolidated Niujie’s role as the major source of beef and mutton for the Hui people throughout Beijing. Tourism is another prominent ethnic economic activity in Niujie. The Niujie mosque, in particular, has been visited by not only Hui and Han Chinese across the nation but also Muslims from other countries. In fact, the Beijing government has designated the Niujie mosque as an important place of visit for delegates and leaders from Islamic countries. The role of the government in showcasing the mosque has therefore facilitated the preservation of the enclave’s ethnic character.

The ethnic economy in Madian, on the other hand, has suffered from urban expansion. As described earlier, the sheep market was demolished prior to the reforms. Economic activities linked to the sheep market also suffered. In addition, the declining concentration of the Hui people in Madian adversely affected demand for ethnic economic activities in the enclave. By 2000, only three or four beef and mutton shops, eight small restaurants, and several groceries remained in Madian. As the later phases of the renovation project unfold, it is likely that most of these businesses will disappear. Historically, the Hui people in Madian were highly concentrated in businesses linked to the sheep market and were less proficient in other economic activities. Consequently, the decline of ethnic economic activities and the decreasing proportion of Hui in Madian are mutually reinforcing processes. In our interview
with the head of a resident committee in Madian in August 2000, he remarked that many Hui people there preferred to purchase beef and mutton from Niujie, despite the commute that such a practice required. This is evidence that Niujie’s role as a large enclave and major supplier for the Hui people in Beijing has been enhanced as the ethnic economy of Madian gradually declined.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

Our case study of Niujie and Madian, two Hui enclaves in Beijing, supports the conventional understanding of the roles of social distance, identity, ethnic economy, and ethnic enclave economy in explaining the existence and persistence of ethnic enclaves. But conventional wisdom tends to downplay the role of geography, which we argue is a major factor for the decline of Madian as an ethnic enclave.

We have pointed out that urban expansion threatens ethnic enclaves that lie in its path. Madian’s accessibility and its location in one of the most rapidly growing areas of Beijing have made it a desirable site for new residential and commercial real estate development. Madian’s experience hints at possible impacts of urban expansion on other former Hui enclaves, as evidenced by the demolition of mosques primarily in the central and northern parts of Beijing (“former mosques” in Fig. 2). We have also highlighted the role of administrative geography. Specifically, Madian is split between two different street administrative offices that must also address non-Hui issues in areas adjacent to the enclave. As a result, Madian does not have access to one specific administrative body that could advocate the interests of the Hui residents there. The high prices of new apartments, the disappearance of Islamic symbols, and the low return rates of former Hui residents all indicate that the enclave is losing its historical ethnic character and is being assimilated into the larger urban landscapes of Beijing.

Niujie, on the other hand, has continued to thrive despite renovation and urban renewal projects. Plans for renovation that highlight the Niujie mosque aim at preserving the ethnic identity of the enclave; return rates of Hui residents are high; and Niujie has consolidated its role as a major supplier of Hui foods and services to the entire city. The presence of a hospital, schools, and other social services dedicated to the Hui people suggests further that Niujie has become a full-fledged ethnic enclave performing comprehensive functions. Unlike Madian, Niujie is located in the southern and more peripheral part of the city; also unlike Madian, Niujie is under the jurisdiction of a single street administrative office, which places it in a better position to represent the interests of Hui residents. The residential function, ethnic economy, and ethnic enclave economy of Niujie are likely to persist. In short, in this paper we have shown that geographic, in addition to social, perspectives are important for understanding the evolution of ethnic enclaves and their divergent paths of development. Our case study suggests that analyses of the evolution and geography of ethnic enclaves can shed important light on the persistence and decline of urban neighborhoods.

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the social distance between Han and ethnic minorities remains large and that economic and residential enclaves are important for ethnic minorities in the Chinese city to preserve their cultures. Compared with ethnic enclaves in Western cities, Hui enclaves are not only sources of social networks and livelihood for the Hui minority but also are critical for their practices of religion and customs derived from Islam. The well-being of ethnic minorities is a contested issue in China. In the Beijing case, the role of the government has been conducive, if not central, in preserving Niujie as an important enclave for the Hui community. However, these concentrated and
selective efforts are not sufficient for arresting the decline of other Hui enclaves and perhaps non-Hui ethnic enclaves as well, which have little leverage when confronted with the pressures of urbanization. Unlike some ethnic communities in the United States, most of the Hui people who moved out from the enclaves did not do so because of socioeconomic advancement or social assimilation but because of the enclaves’ absorption by the mainstream urban landscape. Whether these ethnic minorities are able to establish enclave-like neighborhoods elsewhere is key to the likelihood of their maintaining their Muslim cultures, identity, and community in the Chinese city.

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